

CommitCoin:

Carbon Dating Commitments with Bitcoin

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Overview

- We propose a method for creating **commitments** that can later be **carbon dated** to the approximate time of creation
- A general method uses **moderately hard functions** but has limitations that make it impractical for deployment
- **CommitCoin** resolves these drawbacks by using the **Bitcoin** block-chain

Proof of Work / Puzzles

- Cryptographic Puzzles:
 - Generate puzzle p with difficulty d from randomness r
 $p = \text{Gen}(d, r)$
 - Compute solution s to puzzle p
 $s = \text{Solve}(p)$
 - Verify solution s to puzzle p
 $\text{Verify}(p, s)$
- **Gen** and **Verify** are efficient; **Solve** is moderately hard

Related Work on Puzzles

- **Moderately hard function:**
 - processing time
 - memory access time
 - storage
- **Applications:**
 - time-release encryption & commitments
 - metering access to prevent email spam or DOS
 - minting coins in digital cash

Carbon Dating

PROTOCOL 1 (Commitments with Carbon Dating)

Input: Alice has message m at t_0 .

Output: Bob decides if m was known by Alice prior to pivot time t_1 .

The protocol:

1. **PRE-INSTANTIATION:** At t_0 , Alice commits to m with randomness r by computing $c = \text{Comm}(m, r)$. She then generates puzzle based on c with difficulty d (such that the time to solve it is approximately Δt) by computing $p = \text{Gen}(d, c)$. She outputs $\langle c, p \rangle$.
2. **INSTANTIATION:** At t_1 , Alice begins computing $s = \text{Solve}(p)$.
3. **RESOLUTION:** At $t_2 = t_1 + \Delta t$, Alice completes $s = \text{Solve}(p)$ and outputs $\langle s, m, r \rangle$. Bob checks that both $\text{Verify}(s, \text{Gen}(d, c))$ and $\text{Open}(c, m, r)$ accept.

If so, Bob decides if $t_2 - \Delta t \stackrel{?}{\ll} t_1$

Ideal Puzzle


- Two main puzzles: repeated squaring and hash-based
- Repeated squaring:
 - Inherently sequential
 - Verifiable by only creator (and easy to solve by creator)
- Hash-based
 - Creator can also solve it while anyone can verify (non-interactive)
 - Trivially parallelizable


Carbon Dating


- **Drawback 1**: no ideal proof of work protocol
- **Drawback 2**: must devote CPU
- **Drawback 3**: consider predicating an election outcome, nothing stops you from carbon dating commitments to each possible outcome
- **Drawback 4**: carbon dating is very fuzzy: too fuzzy to be useful?


Bitcoin

- Bitcoin is a digital currency
- A **public transcript** of every transaction is maintained by a group of nodes
- Sufficient to only understand this transcript (“block chain”) to understand CommitCoin










Amount: 100 BTC
To: [PubKey Fingerprint]_B
From: [PubKey]_A
Signed: By A



Each hash is a proof of work. Find an n_i such that:

$$H(B_i || n_i) = \{0\}^d || \{0,1\}^{n-d}$$

Takes 2^{d-1} hash evaluations on average

Can be parallelized (without storage: suitable for GPU)

CommitCoin

- Idea: insert commitment into the block chain, and the chain of **proof of works** will provide **carbon dating**
- Resolves the need to devote a CPU
- While parallelizable, **variance** in computational power across network is **smaller** than a single individual
- Largest pool reports **2^{42} hashes/s**

CommitCoin

- Question: **how to insert?**
- Solution 1:
 - Find a unchecked field in the transaction spec
 - **Drawback:** could be patched
- Solution 2:
 - Set commitment value to public key fingerprint
 - **Drawback:** “burns” money

CommitCoin

- Set **commitment value** to ECDSA **private key**
- Commitment is randomized; functions as key
- Send 2 units of BTC to corresponding public key (**fingerprint** added to transcript)
- Send 1 unit back to originating account (**public key** added to transcript)
- Send 1 unit back using same randomness (private key/**commitment** computable from transcript)

Application

- **Scantegrity** is a verifiable voting system
- It uses **pre-election commitments** that are used after the election to prove the tally is correct
- **Simple attack**: change pre-election commitments after the election
- **Detectable**: by verifiers who obtain commitments before the election (but is this really *universally verifiable*?)
- In 2011 **Takoma Park** election, we used **CommitCoin**
- Known **pivot** and **negligible probability** that an unsound pre-election commitment will verify

Drawbacks Revisted

- Drawback 1: no ideal proof of work protocol
 - Sidestep parallelization issue
- Drawback 2: must devote CPU
 - Use Bitcoin
- Drawback 3: can carbon date commitments to linearly many messages
 - Scantegrity pre-election commitments is large space
- Drawback 4: carbon dating is very fuzzy: too fuzzy to be useful?
 - Can pre-commitment months before election day

