

# On linear complexity of sequences over $GF(2^n)$

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## Abstract

In this paper, we consider some aspects related to determining the linear complexity of sequences over  $GF(2^n)$ . In particular, we study the effect of changing the finite field basis on the minimal polynomials, and thus on the linear complexity, of sequences defined over  $GF(2^n)$  but given in their binary representation. Let  $\mathbf{a} = \{a_i\}$  be a sequence over  $GF(2^n)$ . Then  $a_i$  can be represented by  $a_i = \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} a_{ij} \alpha^j$ ,  $a_{ij} \in GF(2)$ , where  $\alpha$  is the root of the irreducible polynomial defining the field. Consider the sequence  $\mathbf{b} = \{b_i\}$  whose elements are obtained from the same binary representation of  $\mathbf{a}$  but assuming a different set of basis (say  $\{\gamma_0, \gamma_1, \dots, \gamma_{n-1}\}$ ), i.e.,  $b_i = \sum_{j=0}^{r-1} a_{ij} \gamma_j$ . We study the relation between the minimal polynomial of  $\mathbf{a}$  and  $\mathbf{b}$ .

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## 1. Introduction

The linear complexity of a given sequence is defined as the length of the shortest linear feedback shift register (LFSR) [2] which can produce this sequence [11]. The sequence linear complexity is one measure of its predictability. If the linear complexity of a sequence  $\mathbf{s}$  is  $l$ , then the cryptanalyst can recover the entire sequence by observing  $2l$  consecutive elements of  $\mathbf{s}$  [7]. Thus, stream cipher designers should ensure that sequences produced by their ciphers have large linear complexity.

While many classical stream ciphers were based on bit-wise operations, most of modern stream cipher [1] tend to operate on words (e.g. 8–32 bit) in order to provide efficient software implementations. Feedback shift registers over  $GF(2^n)$  are becoming popular building blocks in many of these ciphers (e.g., the NESSIE submissions SOBER-t16 and SOBER-t32 [8]).

In this paper, we consider a practical issue that faces the cryptanalyst when trying to determine the linear complexity of a given  $GF(2^n)$  sequence. Consider a cryptanalyst who observes a key stream, naturally represented as a binary stream of bits. Assuming that  $n$  as well as the boundary between the  $n$ -tuples are known, an interesting question is which basis should the cryptanalyst use to evaluate the linear complexity of the given sequence. The following example illustrate this point.

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**Example 1.** Consider the following binary representation of a periodic sequence over  $GF(2^3)$ :

$$\begin{aligned} &\{001, 011, 000, 100, 111, 000, 110, \\ &001, 000, 101, 100, 000, 010, 110, \\ &000, 011, 101, 000, 111, 010, 000\}. \end{aligned}$$

If we use the irreducible polynomial  $x^3 + x + 1$  and assume that binary representation above is using the polynomial basis  $(\alpha^2, \alpha, 1)$  where  $\alpha$  is a root of the irreducible polynomial above, then the above sequence can be described as

$$\mathbf{a} = \{1, \alpha^3, 0, \alpha^2, \alpha^5, 0, \alpha^4, \alpha^0, 0, \alpha^6, \alpha^2, 0, \alpha, \alpha^4, 0, \alpha^3, \alpha^6, 0, \alpha^5, \alpha, 0\}.$$

The minimal polynomial, calculated using the Berlekamp–Massey algorithm [5], is given by  $x^2 + \alpha^3x + \alpha^6 = 0$ , and hence the linear complexity is 2. Thus it suffices to know 4 consecutive tuples of this sequence to fully recover it.

On the other hand, if we use the basis  $(\beta^2, \beta, 1)$  where  $\beta$  is a root of the irreducible polynomial  $x^3 + x^2 + 1$ , then the sequence above is given by

$$\mathbf{b} = \{1, \beta^5, 0, \beta^2, \beta^4, 0, \beta^6, 1, 0, \beta^3, \beta^2, 0, \beta, \beta^6, 0, \beta^5, \beta^3, 0, \beta^4, \beta, 0\}.$$

Again, the Berlekamp–Massey algorithm yields the following minimal polynomial  $x^6 + x^5 + x^4 + x^2 + 1 = 0$ , and hence the linear complexity is 6 which means that the sequence designer might think that at least 12 consecutive tuples of this sequence are needed to fully recover it.

One can think of a  $GF(2^n)$  sequence given in its binary representation as a set of  $n$  sequences over  $GF(2)$ . For example, if  $\mathbf{a}$  is an  $m$ -sequence sequences over  $GF(2^n)$  with minimal polynomial  $m$  of degree  $d$ , then  $\mathbf{a}$  can be decomposed into  $n$  shift equivalent  $m$ -sequences over  $GF(2)$  with minimal polynomials of degree  $d \times n$  [3,9]. However, as illustrated by the following example, this may not always be the preferred choice for the cryptanalyst.

**Example 2.** Consider the periodic sequence  $\mathbf{a}$  as defined in Example 1. Then  $\mathbf{a}$  can be decomposed into the following three shift equivalent binary sequences by setting  $\mathbf{a}_i = (\mathbf{a}_{3i}, \mathbf{a}_{2i}, \mathbf{a}_{1i})$

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{a}_1 &= \{1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0\}, \\ \mathbf{a}_2 &= \{0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0\}, \\ \mathbf{a}_3 &= \{0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0\} \end{aligned}$$

with  $m_{\mathbf{a}_1}(x) = m_{\mathbf{a}_2}(x) = m_{\mathbf{a}_3}(x) = x^6 + x^5 + x^4 + x^2 + 1$ . Thus the cryptanalyst needs to observe 12 (required by Berlekamp–Massey algorithm to determine both the connection polynomial and initial state) + 6 (to determine the initial state) + 6 (to determine the initial state) = 24 bits in order to recover the entire sequence. Note that from Example 1, only 4 tuples = 12 bits were required to recover the sequence  $\mathbf{a}$ .

Moreover, for a general  $GF(2^n)$  sequence, the corresponding binary sequences are not necessarily shift equivalent, which implies that the cryptanalyst needs to run the Berlekamp–Massey algorithm for every individual bit separately as illustrated by the following example.

**Example 3.** Let  $\mathbf{a} = \{1, \alpha^3, \alpha, \alpha^5, 0, \alpha^4, \alpha^6, 1, \alpha^3, \alpha, \alpha^5, 0, \alpha^4, \alpha^6\}$  where  $\alpha$  is a root of  $x^3 + x + 1$  over  $GF(2^3)$ . Then we have

$$m_{\mathbf{a}}(x) = x^2 + \alpha^2x + \alpha^6 = (x + 1)(x + \alpha^6).$$

If we assume that the binary representation of  $\mathbf{a}$  is obtained using the polynomial basis, then we get

$$m_{\mathbf{a}_1}(x) = m_{\mathbf{a}_2}(x) = x^3 + x^2 + 1,$$

$$m_{\mathbf{a}_3}(x) = x^4 + x^2 + x + 1.$$

## 2. Mathematical background and definitions

For a background about the general theory of finite fields, the reader is referred to [4] and for a background about finite fields of characteristic 2, the reader is referred to [6]. Throughout the rest of this paper, we will only consider sequences with minimal polynomials that have no multiple roots.

**Definition 1.** A polynomial having the special form

$$L(x) = \sum_{i=0}^t \beta_i x^{2^i}$$

with coefficients  $\beta_i$  from  $GF(2^n)$  is called a linearized polynomial over  $GF(2^n)$ .

**Lemma 1.** Let  $A$  be a linear mapping over  $GF(2^n)$ , then this mapping can be expressed in terms of a linearized polynomial over  $GF(2^n)$

**Lemma 2.** Let  $\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \dots, \alpha_t$  be elements in  $GF(2^n)$ . Then

$$(\alpha_1 + \alpha_2 + \dots + \alpha_t)^{2^k} = \alpha_1^{2^k} + \alpha_2^{2^k} + \dots + \alpha_t^{2^k}.$$

**Lemma 3.** For  $i = 1, 2, \dots, h$  let  $\mathbf{s}_i$  be a homogeneous linear recurring sequence in  $GF(q)$  with minimal polynomial  $m_i(x)$ . Then, the minimal polynomial of the sequence  $\mathbf{s} = \mathbf{s}_1 + \mathbf{s}_2 + \dots + \mathbf{s}_h$ ,  $\mathbf{s}_i \neq \mathbf{s}_j$  for  $i \neq j$ , is given by the least common multiple of  $m_i$ 's, i.e.,  $m(x) = \text{lcm}(m_1, \dots, m_h)$  [4].

## 3. Main results

Let  $\mathbf{a} = \{a_i\}$  be a sequence over  $GF(2^n)$ . Then  $a_i$  can be represented by

$$a_i = \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} a_{ij} \alpha^j, \quad a_{ij} \in GF(2), \quad i = 0, 1, \dots, \quad (1)$$

where  $\alpha$  is the root of the irreducible polynomial defining the field. Consider the sequence  $\mathbf{b} = \{b_i\}$  whose elements are obtained from the same binary representation of  $\mathbf{a}$  but assuming a different set of basis (say  $\{\gamma_0, \gamma_1, \dots, \gamma_{n-1}\}$ ), i.e.,

$$b_i = \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} a_{ij} \gamma_j, \quad i = 0, 1, \dots. \quad (2)$$

Let  $\sigma_j$ ,  $j = 0, \dots, n - 1$  denotes the transform that maps a polynomial  $u(x) = \sum_i u_i x^i$ ,  $u_i \in GF(2^n)$  to

$$\sigma_j(u(x)) = \sum_{i=0}^{r-1} u_i^{2^j} x^i. \quad (3)$$

In what follows, we study the relation between the minimal polynomial of  $\mathbf{b}$  and  $\mathbf{a}$ .

Besides its cryptanalytic significance, the results presented in this paper can be used to efficiently generate of linear streams over  $GF(2^n)$  without performing any multiplication operations. Moreover, most of the results in this paper can also be extended in a straightforward way from  $GF(2^n)$  to  $GF(p^n)$ .

**Lemma 4.** Let  $\mathbf{s}^{(2)} = \{s_i^{(2)}\}$  be the sequence obtained from  $\mathbf{s} = \{s_i\}$  by squaring every element of  $\mathbf{s}$ , i.e.,  $s_i^{(2)} = s_i^2$ . Let  $f_1(x) = \sum_{i=1}^n a_i x^i$  be the minimal polynomial of  $\mathbf{s}$ , then the minimal polynomial of  $\mathbf{s}^{(2)}$  divides  $\sigma_1(f_1(x))$ .

**Proof.** Since  $f_1$  is the characteristic polynomial of  $\mathbf{s}$ , then the sequence  $\mathbf{s}$  satisfies the recurrent relation

$$a_n s(i) + a_{n-1} s(i-1) + \dots + a_0 s(i-n) = 0.$$

By squaring the above equation, and using Lemma 2, we have

$$a_n^2(s(i))^2 + a_{n-1}^2(s(i-1))^2 + \cdots + a_0^2(s(i-n))^2 = 0.$$

Thus we get

$$a_n^2 s^{(2)}(i) + a_{n-1}^2 s^{(2)}(i-1) + \cdots + a_0^2 s^{(2)}(i-n) = 0,$$

which proves the lemma.

**Example 4.** Consider the same periodic sequence given in Example 1 above

$$\mathbf{s} = \{1, \alpha^3, 0, \alpha^2, \alpha^5, 0, \alpha^4, \alpha^0, 0, \alpha^6, \alpha^2, 0, \alpha, \alpha^4, 0, \alpha^3, \alpha^6, 0, \alpha^5, \alpha, 0\}$$

defined over  $GF(2^3)$  where  $\alpha$  is a root of the irreducible polynomial  $x^3 + x + 1$ . The minimal polynomial of  $\mathbf{s}$  is given by  $f_1(x) = x^2 + \alpha^3x + \alpha^6$ .

The minimal polynomial of the sequence

$$\mathbf{s}^{(2)} = \{1, \alpha^6, 0, \alpha^4, \alpha^3, 0, \alpha, 1, 0, \alpha^5, \alpha^4, 0, \alpha^2, \alpha, 0, \alpha^6, \alpha^5, 0, \alpha^3, \alpha^2, 0\}$$

is given by  $x^2 + (\alpha^3)^2x + (\alpha^6)^2 = x^2 + \alpha^6x + \alpha^5 = \sigma_1(f(x))$ . Consequently, the minimal polynomial of the sequence

$$\mathbf{s}^{(4)} = \{1, \alpha^5, 0, \alpha, \alpha^6, 0, \alpha^2, 1, 0, \alpha^3, \alpha, 0, \alpha^4, \alpha^2, 0, \alpha^5, \alpha^3, 0, \alpha^6, \alpha^4, 0\}$$

is given by  $x^2 + (\alpha^3)^4x + (\alpha^6)^4 = x^2 + \alpha^5x + \alpha^3 = \sigma_2(f(x))$ .

**Lemma 5.** Let  $\mathbf{a}$  and  $\mathbf{b}$  be the sequences described by (1), (2) respectively. Then  $\mathbf{b}$  can be expressed as

$$b_i = \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} c_j a_i^{2^j}, \quad c_j \in GF(2^n). \quad (4)$$

**Proof.** By noting that changing the basis is equivalent to applying a linear transformation to the co-ordinates of  $\mathbf{a}$ , the proof follows by applying Lemma 1.

**Theorem 1.** Let  $f(x)$  and  $g(x)$  denote the minimal polynomials corresponding to  $\mathbf{a}$  and  $\mathbf{b}$  described by (1), (2) (and consequently (4)), respectively. Then  $g(x)$  is given by

$$\text{lcm}(\sigma_{i_0}(f(x)), \sigma_{i_1}(f(x)) \cdots \sigma_{i_r}(f(x))), \quad (5)$$

where  $\sigma_{i_j}$  is given by (3), and  $i_j \in \{j | c_j \neq 0\}$ .

**Proof.** The result follows by applying Lemma 3.

**Example 5.** Consider the sequence  $\mathbf{a}$  defined over  $GF(2^4)$  with  $m_a(x) = x^5 + \alpha x^4 + \alpha^9$  where  $\alpha$  is a root of the irreducible polynomial  $x^4 + x^3 + 1$ . Let  $\mathbf{b}$  denote the sequence obtained from  $\mathbf{a}$  assuming the basis  $\{\alpha^6, \alpha^{14}, \alpha, \alpha^2\}$  which corresponds to applying a linear transformation whose linearized polynomial  $L(x) = \alpha^{12}x + \alpha^8x^2 + \alpha^4x^4$  to the coordinates of  $\mathbf{a}$ . Thus we have  $m_b(x) = \text{lcm}(x^5 + \alpha x^4 + \alpha^9, x^5 + \alpha^2 x^4 + \alpha^3, x^5 + \alpha^4 x^4 + \alpha^6) = x^{14} + \alpha^2 x^{13} + \alpha^5 x^{12} + \alpha^{11} x^{11} + \alpha x^{10} + \alpha^{11} x^9 + \alpha^8 x^8 + \alpha^{14} x^7 + \alpha^4 x^6 + \alpha^9 x^5 + \alpha^5 x^4 + \alpha^{13} x^3 + \alpha^3 x^2 + \alpha^8 x + \alpha^{13}$ .

It can be shown that applying a linear transformation for which all the coefficients of the corresponding linearized polynomial are no-zero results in obtaining a characteristic polynomial with 0–1 coefficients. This observation can be used to efficiently generate of linear streams over  $GF(2^n)$  without performing any multiplication operations.

**Example 6.** Consider the sequence defined in Example 1. If we use the basis  $(1, \alpha, \alpha^2)$  instead of  $(\alpha^2, \alpha, 1)$  then the minimal polynomial of the sequence is given by  $x^6 + x^5 + x^4 + x^2 + 1 = \text{lcm}(\sigma_0(f(x)), \sigma_1(f(x)), \sigma_2(f(x)))$  where  $\sigma_0(f(x)), \sigma_1(f(x)), \sigma_2(f(x))$  are as given in Example 4.

It is interesting to extend the results in this paper to sequences defined over Galois rings for which the linear complexity can be calculated using the extended version of Berlekamp–Massey algorithm given in [10].

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