

Making Software Tracing Applicable and Scalable: Experiences and Lessons Learned

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
Software (Persistent) Challenges

- Complexity
- Lack of structure and appropriate documentation
- Initial design no longer valid
- Initial designers no longer available
- New computing platforms do not make things easier


Software (Persistent) Challenges

- Complexity
- Lack of structure and appropriate documentation
- **Investment in software analysis techniques and tools is critical**
- New computing platforms do not make things easier


Software Behaviour Analysis: Simplified View



... a bit more complex



...very complex



Industrial projects


- Project 1: Tracing and monitoring tools for multi-core systems
- Project 2: Host-based anomaly detection systems
- Project 3: Tracing, debugging and configuration of avionic systems

Tracing and monitoring tools for multi-core systems

Develop techniques and tools for the generation and analysis of execution traces of multi-core systems with minimum overhead and disturbance



Project vision




Making trace analysis scalable

- Motivating Example:


A trace generated from a compiler: parsing, preprocessing, lexical analysis, semantic analysis, etc. may contain hundred of thousands of events.

- Typical tools will show this:



How do you know what happens where?

Automatic extraction of execution phases













Init

Parsing


Preprocessing

Lexical analysis


Semantic analysis



TSER: Trace Segmentation through Event Repositioning




Example: Repositioning based on similarity




Application: ArgoUML Trace


Start ArgoUML → Create a class diagram → Stop ArgoUML



Start ArgoUML




Create a class diagram




Stop ArgoUML


Phase 3: Add a class diagram




Aligning user and kernel spaces



Adding state information



Identification du contenu pertinent



Project Explorer

- Traces [7]
 - babelpostgresql.ctf
 - babelpostgresql2.ctf
 - kernel
 - trace-2014-04-23-02-07
 - trace-2014-04-23-02-09
 - trace-2014-04-23-02-10
 - trace-2014-04-23-02-12

Control Flow View

Control Flow Statistics babelpostgresql.ctf

Process	TID	PTID	Birth time	Trace	02:09:23.587500	02:09:23.588000	02:09:23.588500
unity-2d-shell	2349	2261	02:09:23.206257287	trace-20'	[Timeline visualization]		
dconf worker	2350	2261	02:09:23.206257825	trace-20'	[Timeline visualization]		
gdbus	2352	2261	02:09:23.206258356	trace-20'	[Timeline visualization]		
unity-2d-shell	2394	2261	02:09:23.206259079	trace-20'	[Timeline visualization]		
unity-2d-shell	2419	2261	02:09:23.206259706	trace-20'	[Timeline visualization]		
unity-2d-shell	2680	2261	02:09:23.206260384	trace-20'	[Timeline visualization]		
unity-2d-shell	2755	2261	02:09:23.206261719	trace-20'	[Timeline visualization]		

Process: unity-2d-shell
 State: USERMODE
 CPU: 0
 Date: 2014-04-23
 Start Time: 02:09:23.588280417
 Stop Time: 02:09:23.58851765
 Duration: 0.000301348

Events View

kernel trace-2014-04-23-02-10 trace-2014-04-23-02-09

Timestamp	Channel	Event Type	Content
<srch>	<srch>	.*sys_rcvfrom.*	<srch>
02:09:23.588 261 035	channel0_0	sys_rcvfrom	fd=12, ubuf=0x14e20e4, size=4096, flags=0, addr=0x0, addr_len=0x0
02:09:23.588 280 417	channel0_0	exit_syscall	ret=-11
02:09:23.588 581 765	channel0_0	sys_rcvfrom	fd=5, ubuf=0x130e74, size=4096, flags=0, addr=0x0, addr_len=0x0
02:09:23.588 601 425	channel0_0	sys_rcvfrom	fd=12, ubuf=0x14e20e4, size=4096, flags=0, addr=0x0, addr_len=0x0

Tracing and Monitoring Framework

Resource View

Histogram Resources Properties Bookmarks Total Anomaly Detection System

2014 Apr 23 02:09:23.587500 02:09:23.588000 02:09:23.588500

trace-2014-04-23-02-09

Resource	02:09:23.587500	02:09:23.588000	02:09:23.588500
CPU 0	[Timeline visualization]		
IRQ 4	[Timeline visualization]		
IRQ 15	[Timeline visualization]		
IRQ 17	[Timeline visualization]		


Industrial projects


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Host-based Anomaly Detection- Advanced Host-Level Surveillance


Develop modular, adaptive, and scalable Anomaly Detection Systems (ADS) at the level of system call traces; reduce false positives (alarms) and improve the true positives








Advanced Host-Level Surveillance



Advanced Host-Level Surveillance



Kernel State Modeling (KSM)


- KSM is an anomaly detection technique
 - Transforms system calls into kernel modules, called states
 - Detects anomalies at the level of interaction among kernel states
 - Reduces data space used in training and testing
 - Favors efficiency while keeping accuracy

Transforming System Calls into States of Kernel Modules



State	Module in Linux Source Code	# of System Calls
AC	Architecture	10
FS	File System	131
IPC	Inter Process Communication	7
KL	Kernel	127
MM	Memory Management	21
NT	Networking	2
SC	Security	3
UN	Unknown	37

[Source]: <http://syscalls.kernelgork.com>

KSM and Density Plots



Anomaly Detection in Firefox



Normal



Anomalous

Evaluation


Program	# Normal Traces			#Attack Types	#Attack Traces
	Training	Validation	Testing		
Login	4	3	5	1	4
PS	10	4	10	1	15
Stide	400	200	13126	1	105
Xlock	91	30	1610	1	2
Firefox	125	75	500	5	19

Program	Technique	TP rate	FP rate
Login	KSM ($\alpha=0.00$)	100%	0.00%
	Stide (win=6)	100%	40.00%
	Stide (win=10)	100%	40.00%
	HMM (states=10)	100%	40.00%
PS	KSM ($\alpha=0.02$)	100%	10.00%
	Stide (win=6)	100%	10.00%
	Stide (win=10)	100%	10.00%
	HMM (states=5)	100%	30.00%
Xlock	KSM ($\alpha=0.04$)	100%	0.00%
	Stide (win=6)	100%	1.50%
	Stide (win=10)	100%	1.50%
	HMM (states=5)	100%	0.00%
Stide	KSM ($\alpha=0.06$)	100%	0.25%
	Stide (win=6)	100%	4.97%
	Stide (win=10)	100%	5.25%
	HMM (states=5)	100%	0.25%
Firefox	KSM ($\alpha=0.08$)	100%	0.60%
	Stide (win=6)	100%	44.60%
	Stide (win=10)	100%	49.20%
	HMM (states=5)	100%	1.40%

Case Study: Execution Time

	Size of All Traces	KSM	Stide	HMM
Login	26.2KB	4.46 sec	0.03 sec	56.43 min
PS	29.6KB	5.14 sec	0.11 sec	46.24 min
Xlock	47.4MB	1.51 min	12.3 min	13.37 hr
Stide	36.2MB	5.85 min	8.53 min	2.3 day
Firefox	270.6MB	9.35 min	4.17 hr	4.03 day

TotalADS: Integrated Environment for ADS



Industrial projects

- Project 1: Tracing and monitoring tools for multi-core systems
- Project 2: Host-based anomaly detection systems
- Project 3: Tracing, debugging and configuration of avionic systems

Tracing, debugging and configuration of avionic systems


Build efficient algorithms for low overhead, low disturbance tracing of real-time embedded multi-core systems and simulators. Develop special purpose trace analysis debugging, and feature location modules for avionic systems



CAE Simulators




Simulation Scenario




TAWS	Warning Obstacle	TRUE
TAWS	Avoid Obstacle	FALSE

CAE SW Architecture



FSS: Flight Surveillance System
TAWS: Terrain Awareness and Warning System

The Problem




This should be **TRUE**


TAWS	Warning Obstacle	FALSE
TAWS	Avoid Obstacle	FALSE

FALSE

FALSE



FELODE (Feature Location for Debugging)



Case Study: Selected Scenarios

Scenario	Subsystem	Scenario
S1	TAWS Mode1	Aircraft is descending at high speed while flying at low altitude.
S2	TAWS Mode4A	The aircraft is close to the ground and is prepared for landing, but the gears are still up.
S3	TAWS Mode4B	Aircraft is in landing mode but the flaps are in a flight position.
S4	TCAS	Simulate the presence of an intruder with the intention to locate its altitude.
S5	TCAS	Simulate the presence of an intruder with the intention to locate its speed.

FELODE Precision and Recall

Scenarios	N1	N2	N3	Precision (N2/N1)	Recall (N2/N3)
S1	2	1	2	50%	50%
S2	6	3	3	50%	100%
S3	6	3	3	50%	100%
S4	8	3	3	38%	100%
S5	7	4	4	57%	100%


N1: Number of labels detected using FELODE

N2: Number of valid labels using FELODE


N3: Number of valid labels relevant to each scenario (provided by the users)

Future Directions


Foundations (pattern matching, machine learning, etc.)




Foundations (pattern matching, machine learning, etc.)




Model Tracing



Foundations (pattern matching, machine learning, etc.)




Model Tracing




Embedded Systems



Foundations (pattern matching, machine learning, etc.)



Model Tracing




Embedded Systems




Tracing the Cloud



Foundations (pattern matching, machine learning, etc.)



Model Tracing



Embedded Systems



Tracing the Cloud



Trace Analytics



Thank you